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C
O-OPERATIVES HAVE BEEN among the most popular agricultural
organizations offering individual opportunity to rural Canadians. In
China, agricultural organizations have also played an important role in rural development
(Fulton and Rosher 1993). Could the Canadian experience with agricultural co-operatives be
useful for the continuing economic reform of rural China?
China and Canada differ historically, culturally, institutionally, ecologically, and eco-
nomically, so it should not be surprising that co-operatives in these two countries have dif-
ferent visions, objectives, policies, and practices. Agricultural organizations in Canada, for
example, serve the interests of farmers in production, procurement, and marketing. In
China, they are part of the structure of economic governance of the national economy.
Despite these differences, however, the basic needs of rural people, though perhaps more
elaborate and diverse in Canada, are similar in terms of stability, self-respect, and the desire
for greater wealth. Sharing insights that illuminate the problems and opportunities con-
nected with each rural society could beneﬁt both countries.
Thanks are due to a number of individuals and organizations. Murray Fulton and
Brett Fairbairn at the Centre for the Study of Co-operatives, University of Saskatchewan,
shared their invaluable experience and advice. The authors are also grateful for the open
way in which so many people in large and small co-operatives provided detailed insight into
Canadian co-operative organization. In particular, staff of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool
in Regina and the Alberta Wheat Pool in Edmonton supplied useful documentation and
explanations. Richard Stringham of the Rural Education and Development Association in
Edmonton offered important guidance to the study. Editorial services and counsel from
Nora Russell have been invaluable. In the end, however, the authors accept full responsi-
bility for errors of omission or commission.
Thanks to the University of Alberta’s Department of Rural Economy for space, com-
puter facilities, and technical support. Finally, this work would not have been possible
without the ﬁnancial support of the China Canada Scholar Exchange Program of the
Department of Foreign Affairs, Government of Canada, and the administration of the
Association of Universities and Colleges in Canada.INTRODUCTION
T
HIS PAPER is about using co-operatives to continue China’s rural
economic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s into the ﬁrst ﬁfteen years of
the twenty-ﬁrst century. We argue that lessons drawn from the Chinese reforms and the
Canadian co-operative experience can help to carry on the economic reform and modern-
ization of rural China.
The organizational structure of farms and other rural businesses is crucial to capturing
the potential for productivity by rural people in a rural employment and incomes strategy.
In seeking to achieve sustainable agricultural and rural development, co-operatives may
play a major role in maintaining the interest of rural Chinese workers and investors in
their national economy.
The farmer co-operative movement is an international phenomenon. The modern
co-operative was ﬁrst developed in Europe during the late nineteenth century, and spread
among industrializing countries as a self-help method to attack conditions of poverty and
to offset powerful economic interests. Co-operatives rapidly became an integral part of the
Canadian and many other national economies after World War Two. The International
Labour Office in 1991 estimated that co-operatives could be found in 140 of the world’s
171 countries (table 1).
Compare this strong integrated growth of co-operative activity with the co-operative
experience in China, where the movement started ﬁfty years later, stopped in the mid-1950s,
and to date remains peripheral to the economy. The short stage of co-operative organization,
during which farmers gained control over land, gave way in 1959 to the collectivization of
agriculture and land ownership.
The Chinese nomenclature for collective farms was “voluntary co-operatives.” Grad-
ually and with few exceptions, farmers became employees of the state, with little control
over their new collectives. Management was shifted to political cadres with accountability
O CCASIONAL PAPERS SERIES #98–01to a hierarchy of leaders responsible to a central political committee. Growth in the number
of rural economic co-operatives resumed in the 1980s, ﬁrst with production and artisan co-
operatives, and more recently with marketing co-operatives.
Today, rural Chinese households face a formidable task in a competitive and concen-
trated business economy. Farming activities have been hampered by a natural environment
damaged by quarrying, mining, and industrial pollution. In 1978, individual responsibility
reforms made households accountable for economic development in rural China.
Millions of small family farms constitute the dominant form of agricultural household
in China. Income stability and prosperity for the majority of these people seems to be threat-
ened by aspects of the market reforms. Market power is concentrated for inputs, machinery,
and commodities, while remaining widely dispersed for household enterprises. The interests
of the small family farm and other players in the unregulated rural and industrial markets are
contradictory in many respects. Conﬂict between small producers and their suppliers, and in
output markets, is becoming more frequent and more sharply deﬁned.
Modernization, especially in the form of labour-saving technology, is combining with
rural population growth to create unemployment. And population growth is also higher
than the rate of job creation and production in agriculture. Rural industries and services are
expanding rapidly, but at the expense of jobs and job safety, and with unchecked pollution,
as productivity increases.
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Table 1: Membership in the International Co-operative Alliance by Continent (1991)
(Develtere 1992)
No. of orga- No. of individual
nizations Percent members Percent
Developing Countries
Africa 26 13.76 11,553,659 1.72
Asia/Paciﬁc 47 24.87 352,765,602 52.63
Latin America 18 9.52 13,378,063 2.00
Developed Countries
Asia/Paciﬁc (*) 10 5.29 46,396,870 6.92
North America 3 1.59 72,000,000 10.74
Europe 73 38.62 74,092,366 11.05
Former East Block 12 6.35 100,043,491 14.93
Total 191 100.00 670,230,051 100.00
Source: International Co-operative Association Annual Report, 1990–91.
*Australia, Japan.The unemployment problem is not new. But the unemployed, who used to be sup-
ported by paid underemployment shared widely across the collective system, are now with-
out either the respect or support of any paid job. And seniority in job security makes unem-
ployment especially serious for rural youth.
The co-operative model is an obvious choice for addressing these issues, being a proven
option as a cohesive organizational structure for agricultural development in many industri-
alized countries. And economic reforms are rapidly transforming China into an industrial-
ized country.
The main feature of these reforms is the fundamental reworking of the structure of farm
and business property rights, which determines the distribution of economic beneﬁts to
households, and of ﬁnancial gains to rural from urban areas. Successes and failures in this
experience since 1950 tell us that without integrated governmental and rural institutional
changes, the reform of agricultural policies and related economic development plans cannot
be effectively implemented to beneﬁt rural people.
This paper compares co-operatives in Canada and China by examining co-operative con-
cepts, principles, and practices in both countries. It also brieﬂy reviews the historical devel-
opment of co-operatives in Canada and the socialist transformation of agriculture in China.
Finally, it seeks to identify co-operatives suitable for promoting productivity, employment,
production, and market development in China. The essence of the questions pursued in this
paper can be expressed as follows:
• What do the principles of co-operation mean
in the rural Chinese context?
• How do co-operatives work in Canada and China?
• What could farmers’ co-operatives in the two countries
learn from each other for the future?
• What could co-operation in rural China look like
beyond the turn of the century?
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BACKGROUND
A
S THE GLOBAL ECONOMY RESTRUCTURES, the role of agriculture
remains the same in developing countries. The current trend through-
out the world is to decentralize, deregulate, and denationalize economies, including those of
socialist nations (Hanlin 1989). “In developing countries, the possibility of increased agricul-
tural production is to a very considerable extent the key to feeding a growing population, to
achieving social and economic development, to the acquisition of foreign currency and to
the creation of production for export” (Develtere 1992).
Signiﬁcant implications arise for rural communities. Economic liberalization generates
pressure for political reforms, leading to the emergence of co-operative institutions through-
out the world (table 2). The restructuring of rural economic institutions results in the relax-
ation of organizational restrictions, to the advantage of farm incomes. Reduced government
control over farmers can nurture and reward their initiative.
China is both a developing and a social-
ist country. It is also still predominantly an
agricultural country. Both communal, or
collective, agriculture and state farms are
organized around household units. On
small and medium-sized farms, patterns
of production are traditional, with market-
oriented farming activities and subsistence
family consumption intermixed. Co-opera-
tion among farm families is a tradition.
Co-operatives were encouraged and
stimulated by the Government of China
from the beginning of the 1950s, although
C ENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF CO-OPERATIVES
Table 2: Co-operative Membership in Developing









Source: COPAC, 1987.the roles assigned to the organizations were narrow and
their opportunities limited. Agricultural production
co-operatives in China were organized and used by the
Chinese government as a way of pushing forward spe-
ciﬁc policy objectives. The main one was to build a so-
cialist and communist state, which required control over
individualism and production. The government worked
initially with co-operatives as an element in the planning
of national economic development, and for a short time,
they became part of the state ideology, before giving way
to People’s Communes.
Today, economic reforms and the open-door policy
are at the centre of China’s development strategy. The
country began in 1978 to reinstate individual household
incentives to promote agricultural production. Authority
was decentralized, thus increasing the responsibility of
family units. The large-scale introduction of the family
household responsibility system (table 3) not only con-
tributed to immediate rapid growth in agricultural
production, but also resulted in the rethinking of the
organization of agricultural economies in rural China.
As can be seen in the table, the effect of the respon-
sibility reforms is dramatic. Only 1 percent of all farms
remain as collective and state farm institutions. Ninety-
nine percent are small, autonomous, household farms,
which poses a difficult challenge for modernization and
the adoption of new technology. There is a broad con-
sensus in China that serious obstacles confront these
millions upon millions of family farms.
Canada is an industrialized trading country, dependent on international trade to main-
tain its economic well-being and standard of living. Canadian agriculture, which is based
primarily upon independently-owned, family-operated farms, has always developed under
the primary governance of market signals. Individual responsibility has been a prominent
feature in motivating progress from the beginning.
Co-operation is also a tradition in Canadian rural communities. When adversity and
misuse of market power brought poverty to farms at the beginning of the 1900s, this tradi-
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Table 3: Percentage of Family Farm
Households Relative to All Farms in
China, 1952–95
























Source: Chinese Agricultural Statistics
Yearbook, 1995.tion led to the formation of co-operative institutions. Organized co-operation not only al-
lowed the relatively small and powerless producers to improve and stabilize their incomes,
but also contributed to rural modernization. The rural electriﬁcation co-operatives are a
good example. Co-operatives also made a signiﬁcant contribution to ﬂexibility in the process
of marketing agricultural commodities.
Co-operative organizations have ﬂourished in Canada (table 4), and for more than
twenty years, they have been helping co-operatives in developing countries to improve their
management and operations. There is now a historic opportunity for Canada to make a
major contribution to the agricultural economic reform taking place in rural China. China
is an important economic partner for Canada. Co-operatives could play a useful role in sup-
porting the development of this long-term relationship between the two countries.
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Table 4: Examples of Early Co-operatives in Western Canada
Year Co-operatives
1905–06 Grain Grower’s Grain Company
1911 Saskatchewan Co-op Elevator Company
1913 Alberta Co-op Elevator Company
1920 Saskatchewan Co-op Export Company
1923 Manitoba Pool; Alberta Wheat Pool
1924 Saskatchewan Co-op Wheat Producers (Sask. Wheat Pool)
1927 Manitoba Co-op Wholesale
1928 Alberta Co-op Wholesale Association Ltd.
1929 Saskatchewan Co-op Wholesale Society Ltd.
1931 Oil Co-ops
1934 Consumers Co-operative Reﬁneries Ltd.
1939 The First Co-op Tractor
1941 Saskatchewan Co-op Credit Society
1946 Co-op Vegetable Oil Plant
Source: Building a Dream, 1989.PART TWO
THE IDEA OF CO-OPERATION
IN CANADA AND CHINA
T
HE TERM “CO-OPERATIVE” is used the world over, with many
meanings for the ideas, principles, and methods of organization associ-
ated with it. A review of the fundamental principles of co-operation clariﬁes the role co-op-
eratives could play in restructuring farm and market institutions in China.
STATEMENT OF CO-OPERATIVE PRINCIPLES
The statement on co-operative identity adopted at the ICA’s 1995 General Assembly is used
in this paper as the standard for comparison. Established following a lengthy process of con-
sultation with thousands of co-operatives around the world, it covers the deﬁnition, values,
practices, and principles of co-operation.
The ICA deﬁnition of a co-operative is “an autonomous association of persons united
voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs, with democratically
controlled enterprise.”
Seven principles guide co-operatives as they put their values into practice:
1. Voluntary and open membership;
2. Democratic member control;
3. Member economic participation;
4. Autonomy and independence;
5. Education, training, and information;
6. Co-operation among co-operatives;
7. Concern for community.
O CCASIONAL PAPERS SERIES #98–01These seven principles can be summarized in the following way: (1) The primary aim of
co-operatives is to provide services for their members; that is, they are self-help organiza-
tions; (2) Co-operatives are run on principles of democratic management; and (3) Co-opera-
tives are open and autonomous organizations based on voluntary participation and freedom
of withdrawal (Vanek 1971).
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND
THE BEGINNINGS OF CO-OPERATION
The contemporary history of Canada, as of all the Americas, begins in the sixteenth century
with European discoveries—incidents in the expansion of trade, and a result of the related
ambitions of commerce, Christian missions, imperial designs, and pure adventure (Glaze-
brook 1950). Up to that point, nomadic hunting and gathering had dominated a tribal econ-
omy and continued to do so well into the 1600s. Fur trading in the West, and agricultural
colonization and lumbering in the East displaced the tribal economy over the next two
hundred years, and the country was uniﬁed in 1867, with borders secured by the end of
the century.
Export markets were a natural consequence of colonial status and European immigra-
tion, and markets and market conduct became the impetus for the  agricultural co-operative
movement. Farmers lacked information, were expanding production rapidly, and faced un-
competitive markets for both supplies and outputs.
By the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, conditions in rural Canada were very
basic: poor farmers, large isolated spaces, no infrastructure, and new immigration. Canadian
farmers faced rising costs, difficulties in marketing, and shortages of labour (MacPherson
1979). Many farm input and product markets were inadequate or unfair, with the result that
farmers were unable to get necessary supplies or sell their products. Agricultural producers
consequently began to feel strongly about the need for market power and tried to improve
their position by collective action, largely by establishing both buying and selling co-opera-
tives and lobbying for legislation to improve competitive practices.
The farmers’ thirst for reform was met by the co-operative movement. During the 1920s,
wheat pools were formed in the Prairie Provinces to handle and sell grain. Other co-opera-
tives, for such groups as fruit growers in British Columbia, and various dairy co-operatives,
were also formed to improve bargaining power (Menzie 1980).
The result was the emergence of a series of co-operative movements based on local, re-
gional, and international needs. Farmers joined co-operatives through self-help, for self-care
and self-reliance, primarily to provide economic security and improve their competitive posi-
8Z HU AND APEDAILE
CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF CO-OPERATIVEStions in the market and in bargaining with the state. At the same time, they managed to
preserve important elements of autonomy in family farms (Bergmann and Takekazu 1985).
This early co-operative activity has resulted in some major co-operative players in
Canada’s agricultural economy in the 1990s. Canada’s largest co-operative in 1996, the
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, became operational on June 26, 1924. It takes a strong organ-
ization to survive and prosper for seventy-two years. Many other co-operatives play signiﬁ-
cant roles in the Canadian economy in the processing and marketing of grain, dairy goods,
poultry, honey, maple products, fruit and vegetables, and livestock. Supply and marketing
co-operatives have continued to increase their share of agricultural markets. Co-operatives
have more than a 50 percent market share in grains and oilseeds and the dairy business, over
30 percent in poultry, and more than 20 percent in livestock, honey, and maple (table 5).
In China, the history of co-operative development is totally different. China became
a centralized feudal monarchy when the ﬁrst emperor of the Qin dynasty uniﬁed most of
today’s modern China in 221 BC. Local regional markets had been established for more than
six thousand years before that. Colonization has been conﬁned to recent population move-
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Table 5: Estimate of the Percent of Market Share Held by Co-operatives
for Various Commodities, Canada, 1977–93
Commodities Year
1977 1982 1983 1987 1988 1991 1992 1993
Grains and Oilseeds
(West) 81 76 76 72 73 74 71 75
Grains and Oilseeds
(Ontario) 19 21 21 15 17 12 19 14
Fruit 10 17 17 19 16 15 15 18
Vegetables 10 9 9   10 12 12 11 11
Dairy 51 51 51 58 57 59 60 63
Poultry 32 35 35 35 32 39 48 47
Eggs 93344544
Livestock: Cattle 18 17 17 18 20 23 21 21
Livestock: Hogs 11 13 13 14 15 18 25 22
Fish 10 12 12 109987
Honey & Maple 23 25 25 23 26 23 23 29
Source: Co-operatives in Canada, 1994, p25; 1995, p22.ments to remote regions such as Heilongjiang and Xinjiang. Immigration has not played a
role in economic development, but surplus labour, especially rural, has been a problem.
During the two thousand years from the Qin dynasty to the Communist revolution, the
family farm was the traditional form of agricultural institution in rural China, but not as we
know it in Canada. Most family farms, for example, did not have private and exclusive prop-
erty rights, but were dependent on feudal arrangements with relatively few landowners, who
owned most of the arable land. This “isolated society system” coexisted with centralized state
power.
Chinese agriculture developed to this day under conditions of limited land, surplus la-
bour, and continuous population pressure. Historically, poverty and malnutrition were the
only destinies for most rural people, as illustrated by these old sayings: “The people look
upon food as heaven”; and “Grain is the treasure of treasures.” Out of this hardship grew a
deep tradition of co-operation and mutual aid.
Geopolitical events in this century resulted in an opportunity for the Chinese revolution
to remove the feudal system and redistribute land. Once nutrition improved and basic needs
were met, however, Chinese farmers faced the new problem of expanding output capacity.
In the three decades from 1949 to 1979, natural calamities, poor irrigation and transportation
infrastructure, lack of ﬁnancing for agriculture, and shortages of land and farm implements
became the focus of attention.
From the farmers’ side, their need for land without the possibility of ownership led them
to work together to level and terrace land and build irrigation works. The Party called upon
Chinese farmers “to organize and go the way of common prosperity.” In response, farmers
initially organized themselves into small groups at the village level for production. At the
same time, the government geared up its socialist revolution in rural China with major con-
struction and co-operative campaigns communicated by slogans. “Take grain as the key and
ensure an all-round development” emphasized growth in grain production and the need to
improve yields. “Go all out, aim high, and achieve greater, faster, better, and more economi-
cal results in building socialism” promoted the ideas of hard work and acceptance of institu-
tional reform. In China, traditional rural co-operation was reinforced by the fact that all
decisions relating to production and consumption were focussed on the collectivization of
property rights and labour initiative.
10 ZHU AND APEDAILE
CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF CO-OPERATIVESWHAT DOES “CO-OPERATIVE” MEAN
IN CANADA AND CHINA?
This brief historical comparison shows that the beginnings of co-operatives in the two
countries are quite different. In China, the starting point in the 1940s was the extreme
poverty of landless family farms locked in feudal arrangements with landowners. As social
pressure mounted, co-operatives were seen as a strategic way to redistribute property rights
and relieve poverty. Co-operatives were not so much a social movement as a government
response to a political problem.
In western Canada, the starting point ﬁfty years earlier was a need for market outlets
for production, and a conviction that individual initiative could be motivated best by the
prospect of earnings from private and exclusive property rights. When these earnings were
diluted by exploitive business practices, mainly by the private grain trade, co-operatives
emerged as a social movement to gain control over markets and transaction services. Co-
operatives rarely became directly involved in agricultural production, with the exception
of a few experiments by returning war veterans in Saskatchewan during the early ﬁfties.
Having emerged from such different situations, it is not surprising that Canadian and
Chinese co-operatives also have different ideas about the scope of their roles.
Table 6, next page, compares the two situations, and it should be noted that this paper
conﬁnes its treatment to western Canadian co-operatives. Ontario, Québec, and Atlantic
Canada also have a vibrant history of co-operatives in rural development, but the diversity
of forms and experience in all of Canada is too great to enable generalization beyond basic
principles and organization.
Western Canadian co-operatives see themselves as conforming closely with the ICA prin-
ciples. In fact, Professor Ian MacPherson, a former president of the Canadian Co-operative
Association, headed the ICA committee that wrote the deﬁnition and the principles. In
Canada, co-operatives are based on the values of self-help, self-responsibility, democracy,
equality, equity, and solidarity (MacPherson 1996). In rural western Canada, a co-operative
is a user-owned and user-controlled business that distributes beneﬁts on the basis of use.
Co-operatives are controlled, owned, and patronized on a voluntary basis. They do not limit
individual freedom or private property rights, politically or economically. Participation by
members, employees, owners, or patrons is strictly voluntary (MacPherson 1979).
The Alberta Wheat Pool, organized in 1923, is a good example. It is a farmer-owned co-
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Fully integrated grain handling, marketing, and agri-business services are offered to farmers
through a network of grain elevators and agro-centres located throughout the agricultural
regions of Alberta and northeastern British Columbia. Alberta Pool today has 56,900 mem-
bers and employs fourteen hundred people. It is globally competitive in developing grain
handling technology, and has introduced new improved crop varieties both for the beneﬁt
of its farmer members and in response to customer demands for seed and crop exports. This
modern business was started by farmers banding together to overcome problems that could
not be solved by one person (MacPherson 1979).
The idea of co-operation has a speciﬁc meaning in modern Canada. In China, however,
the idea is associated with traditional means of doing things together in a household, a fam-
ily, or in a territorial grouping like a village. It has been a cultural value in rural China for
thousands of years.
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Table 6: Comparison of the Application of the Seven Principles of Co-operation
in Canada and China
Co-operative Decision
Factors Canada China
1. Control Members  The State
2. Ownership Jointly owned Government owned
by members
3. Distribution of proﬁt Limited by law; Work points
on the basis of
use (patronage)
4. Organization A group of members; By government
one member, one vote;
from bottom to top
5. Purpose Usually a speciﬁc pur- Multipurpose combined
pose with social goals with political objectives
6. Values Self-help, self-responsibility, Collectivization; resource
democracy, equality, equity, centralization; compulsory
and solidarity accumulation in the service
of industrialization
7. Leadership Directly elected by Indirectly elected by
and from members members, or assigned by
higher level leaders who
are not membersThese values of mutual support were not practised within a formal organizational struc-
ture or governed by explicit principles. They were directed more towards the immediate
satisfaction of needs, or problem solving, than towards production for the market. Co-opera-
tion was frequently of limited duration, continuing just until the job was done, and it was
restricted to members of the group (Van Dooren 1982).
Immediately following civil peace in China in 1949, primary farm household production
was organized into co-operatives as part of land reform. These production co-operatives were
strongly dependent on government supervision. Land sales were prohibited, as was the hir-
ing of labour and the lending of money with interest. The principles of co-operation were
deﬁned as “a law of conduct” or “rule of behaviour” to govern the practice or method of op-
eration (Van Dooren 1982). Agricultural co-operatives in China were not based on, and
therefore never established, strong traditions of voluntary participation, autonomy, or
democracy (table 6).
CO-OPERATIVES AND GOVERNMENTS
The relationship between co-operatives and governments in most countries evolves with
their economic and social structures. It generally starts with government actively promoting
and favouring co-operatives in response to a combined social and economic problem. Later,
governments reduce their support, with varying degrees of disengagement from political
commitment and  privileged policy treatment.
Canada has three levels of government: a central federal government, ten provincial gov-
ernments and three territorial governments, and hundreds of regional, municipal, county,
and aboriginal governments. In the evolution of the co-operative movement, relationships
with the federal and provincial governments have changed from an active promotional role
to a passive regulatory role. Municipal government involvement is limited mainly to taxing
property owned by co-operatives. Many aboriginal governments actively support the forma-
tion of new co-operatives and help others to continue operations.
The Government of China has always played a dominant organizational role in agricul-
tural co-operation. Beginning during the years of civil war, co-operatives were organized by
governments on both sides of the conﬂict to meet socioeconomic and political objectives.
The government continued to completely control co-operatives up to 1979. Since then, its
political involvement has remained strong, but the focus has shifted slightly from political
activity to economics and management.
Co-operatives in Canada today are viewed by government as independent businesses,
similar to any other company, apart from their function as social movements. Co-operatives
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business sector has successfully lobbied governments to remove special privileges in the ﬁelds
of taxation and ﬁnance. Some would assert that co-operatives are currently at a tax disadvan-
tage relative to corporate competition.
The history of co-operatives as social movements inﬂuences provincial government atti-
tudes towards them. The Alberta government, for example, is populist conservative, with lit-
tle empathy for social movements. Saskatchewan, on the other hand, is populist socialist,
with a tradition of supporting social movements. The Government of Alberta, consequently,
has actively discouraged the development of the Alberta Wheat Pool, other co-operatives,
and general farm organizations, whereas Saskatchewan encourages and guides co-operatives
towards development and modernization. As a result, the Alberta Wheat Pool members and
directors have responded to change like a marginalized group, using more traditional ﬁnanc-
ing methods, and taking longer to restructure than their counterpart in Saskatchewan.
THE CO-OPERATIVE EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS
Farmers’ Co-operatives in Canada
The development and growth of Canadian farmers’ co-operative organizations has been
mainly consistent, with major gains in business volume during the boom decades of the
1950s, early 1960s, and 1980s (table 7). The number of co-operatives grew steadily from 795
in 1932 to 5,150 in 1993. Membership has also continued to grow without interruption to
exceed 4 million in 1993.
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Table 7: Total Farmer Marketing, Purchasing, and Related Service Co-operatives, 1932–93
Year Number of Membership Volume of Assets
Co-ops (millions) Business (millions)
(millions)
1932 795 .380 145 70
1942 1,789 .566 260 129
1952 2,616 1,373 1,143 454
1962 2,836 1,666 1,421 692
1972 2,208 1,774 2,792 1,334
1982 3,053 2,899.5 13,928.3 5,453.5
1992 5,096 3,821 16,369.9 10,069.0
1993 5,150 4,093 20,658.8 12,310.1
1994 5,242 4,259 22,397.8 12,886.2
1995 5,412 4,504 24,845.7 14,055.2
Source: Co-operatives in Canada (1992 data) Fall 1994, (1993 data) October 1995, (1994 data) June 1996,
and (1995 data) July 1997.This steady growth demonstrates that Canadian co-operatives have great vitality and
resilience. The main characteristics required for co-operatives to survive the evolutionary
process in Canada are: voluntary participation independent from the state; clear focus on a
purpose; activity beyond local boundaries; organization to suit their focus; and adaptability.
We stress the principles of voluntary participation, autonomy, and democratic manage-
ment. Co-operatives in Canada generally stick to these principles, to varying degrees, to
create effective institutions relatively independent of the state. The state does play an impor-
tant role, however, in ensuring that co-operatives respond to their members, are not coer-
cive, and retain their independence. Voluntary participation and democracy, with the
freedom to enter and exit the membership, are viewed as the foundation for the continued
vitality of Canadian co-operative organizations.
Successful co-operatives have a clear and concrete purpose for co-operation, practising
either as specialized or comprehensive organizations. Specialized types include credit co-
operatives; supply and marketing co-operatives for speciﬁc branches of production, such
as dairy, grain, vegetables, and ﬂowers; housing co-operatives; and consumer co-operatives.
Comprehensive co-operatives, diversiﬁed into a conglomerate of activities within and be-
yond agriculture, focus on economies of size, risk reduction, and proﬁt to ﬁnance patronage
dividends and expansion of their capacity to do business.
The evolutionary process for agricultural co-operatives in Canada leads the organizations
to cross territorial or administrative boundaries in search of markets and procurement ad-
vantages leading to expanded market share at home. Services grow to match the growing
sophistication of their members’ needs.
Canadian co-operatives are evolving in two directions—ﬁrst, towards a broader ﬁnancial
structure involving new equity holders outside the membership; and second, towards a pro-
duction organization capable of delivering on large volume, standard quality contracts.
The Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (SWP) is an example of a co-operative involving new
nonmember equity holders. It has become a publicly-traded company on the Toronto Stock
Exchange. It is now an integrated and diversiﬁed conglomerate engaged in agri-business in
several countries, and has a close economic alliance with Cargill, one of the world’s largest
conglomerate agricultural trading companies. The SWP is Canada’s largest publicly-traded
agri-business company,  and it continues to be organized and governed by co-operative prin-
ciples. The new company has introduced new policy and member services functions, which
are complementary to global commercial agri-business activities. The company believes that
rebuilding, upgrading, and modernizing its grain-handling facilities, together with further
investments in value-added grain processing, are key strategies for the company’s continued
success and growth in the coming years.
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specializing in supplying or carrying out value-added processing. NGCs are selected-mem-
bership co-operatives. A common reason for their formation is the desire to gain access to a
greater share of the consumers’ food dollar. NGCs represent a younger generation of farmers
preparing to engage in deregulated markets, specialized market niches, and increased vertical
co-ordination and integration in business. A key feature that distinguishes them from other
more traditional co-operatives is the linking of producer capital contributions and product
delivery rights (Harris et al 1995). Discovering new relationships between co-operatives and
other companies is becoming a trend across Canada. NGCs are at the forefront of these new
relationships, improving on what traditional co-operatives have already achieved.
The change from reliance on an export agricultural economy to participation in the
global economy requires co-operatives to change their structure and face new challenges to
their principles. The global economy trades extensively in intermediate goods and services.
Rapid social change, accompanying involvement in the global economy, is replacing the
traditional co-operative ethic with competitive values. Later in this paper, we discuss New
Generation Co-operatives and the implications of these changes for future economic reforms
in rural China.
Farmers’ Co-operatives in China
The years of agricultural economic reform in China, listed brieﬂy below, are summarized in
detail from the co-operative perspective, in table 8. Five periods stand out; that of People’s
Communes is the longest, lasting twenty years through ﬁve upheavals.
1950–52: Mutual aid and co-operation
1953–54: Elementary agricultural producers’ co-operatives
1955–57: Advanced agricultural producers’ co-operatives






1979–present: Household Responsibility Reforms; new economic co-operatives
From the early 1940s, the small number of co-operatives founded in rural China was
based on principles roughly comparable to those in Canada. They were formed in both the
Communist resistance base areas, as well as in some regions under Guomindang control.
Most were service organizations, including consumer, supply and marketing, and credit
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mainly in the form of the traditional mutual aid groups involving small farmers. The Com-
munist Party, particularly after 1943, promoted diverse forms of mutual aid and small-scale
co-operation in their base areas (Selden 1993).
From their inception, a tension developed between the autonomous and democratic ten-
dencies of these co-operatives on the one hand, and the State’s inclination to control the
rural economy and society on the other. Food scarcity, civil war, and political upheaval in
this predominantly agrarian country made any institutional change a sensitive issue.
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, land reform based on the principle of “land to the tiller”
would have favoured the development of co-operatives if private property rights had been
assured for the tiller. But the central role of land and labour in Marxist reforms to eliminate
tenancy and hired labour led to communal rights instead. These early reforms resulted in
roughly equal per capita landholding within each village, producing one of the world’s most
equitable land distribution patterns, and one that continues to the present (Selden 1993).
Co-operatives played a strategic and central role in the process of land reform during the
eight years up to 1958 (table 8). First, the seasonal Mutual Aid Teams expanded rapidly from
the resistance base areas to all rural areas in China. These were the prelude to full-ﬂedged
co-operatives. Private land ownership with redistribution continued through 1953 and 1954,
as elementary agricultural producer co-operatives were institutionalized in villages. During
the next three years, property rights were collectivized and the producer co-ops merged as
one co-operative per village. By 1958, the collective property rights were converted to public
property, and the co-operatives transformed into People’s Communes. This system of orga-
nizing rural people and resources lasted through to 1978.
Certain features of the People’s Communes were similar to co-operative principles, but
in practice they had entirely the opposite effect. Collective centralized management, for ex-
ample, left members with little scope for initiative; membership was not voluntary; and a
class system emerged, separating party officials from farmers and peasants, thereby reducing
democratic participation.
Communes were not autonomous. The integration of government administration and
economic management of the People’s Communes strengthened state control. The original
mutual-aid concept was transformed into the production brigade, without most of the rights
to task management and farming initiatives originally shared in the co-operative structure.
State control over production decisions cut off the connection between production and
market signals. Most scope for adaptation and ﬂexibility was removed, and the focus re-
mained on local issues right through to the introduction of the Household Responsibility
Reforms in 1978–79.
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Year Co-operative Member’s Goal Distribution Government
Organization Rights of Surplus Economic
Behaviour
1950 Mutual Aid Teams; Private ownership Promotion of According to Go the way of the collec-
Temporary and of all assets agricultural land, livestock, tivization of agriculture;
All-Year-Round production and farm tools the Mutual Aid Teams
were the prelude to co-
operative development
1953 Elementary Agricul- Privately owned Development of According to the The transition from
tural Producers’ Co- assets; especially a strong socialist- amount of work private ownership to
operatives—the small land plan economy; each member did collective ownership
village co-operatives collectivization and amount of land
contributed
1955 Advanced Collective Transition Based on the The transition
Agricultural and private from collec- principle of from market to
Producers’ property tive owner- “from each ac- the State’s plan
Co-operative— rights ship of land cording to his
one village, to public ability” to “each
one co-op ownership according to his
of land work”
1958 Rural People’s Farmers Resource According to Focus on
Communes partly lose centralization; work points; the collective
spread rapidly control of compulsory farmers earned management
—large-scale their own accumulation little from the system; control
collective destiny in the service sale of their over trade, ﬁnance,
of industriali- harvests; the and personnel;
zation State claimed uniﬁed leadership;
too much for uniﬁed planning;
inputs and paid uniﬁed distri-







1979 People’s Self-orga- Farmers’ Restoration of Development
Communes nized and incomes agri-economics; of a commodity-
continue self-help increase contract work based economy
of farmers
1982 New system of Rights to Rural economic Surplus is Development
Household Re- labour power reform; to shared be- of a socialist 
sponsibililty en- and to mar- restore rights tween indi- economic
terprises (99%); ket products to farmers viduals and system
new economic reintroduced to develop the State—
co-operatives; national ﬁrst farmers
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reintroducing a form of private and exclusive rights to farmland—long-term land leases.
Although rights have not been extended to the buying and selling of land, many different
arrangements have evolved to transfer rights between neighbours and generations.
A variety of new economic co-operatives have emerged in China since the Household
Responsibility Reforms were introduced in 1978. Table 9 provides data for several specialized
types of co-operatives during the years 1985–87. The numbers are signiﬁcant compared to
just ten years earlier, but the slow to no growth during this period suggests either a change
in policy to one that no longer favoured co-operatives, or market limitations such as the
monopoly entitlements granted to State trading companies. Some data from the same source
suggests that these co-operatives are smaller and more specialized than those in Canada.
Since the early 1980s, when farm households regained some economic independence, the
State has promoted or permitted various forms of co-operative organizations (table 9). By
1988, an estimated one hundred thousand Specialized Production Technology Associations
(SPTAs) had been formed, with 2.5 million members (Chinese Association of Science and
Technology, 1988). These economic co-operatives have several new features to match the
economic reforms at the household level. The following discussion examines these features
from the perspective of the ICA principles of co-operation listed earlier.
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Table 9: New Economic Co-operatives in Rural China, 1985–87
Number of Co-ops (thousands)
Category 1985 1986 1987
Plant 2.7 11.0 9.7
Forestry 5.9 4.5 4.3
Livestock husbandry 6.7 4.4 4.5
Fishery 50.9 58.8 65.3
Rural industry 233.3 230.4 236.3
Construction 30.0 34.2 34.7
Transportation 79.3 70.1 63.6
Commerce, food,
drink, service trades 44.7 47.9 48.6
Other trades 21.2 16.3 17.1
Total 484.7 478.1 484.1
Source: Chinese Agricultural Statistics Yearbook, 1991.First, they are self-organized on a voluntary basis. Farmers may opt in or opt out in
accordance with their needs and interests. This feature conforms to the ﬁrst principle of co-
operation outlined by the ICA—that of voluntary participation and mutual beneﬁt.
Second, most leaders are elected by and from the farmer members, though not usually
by secret ballot. Other leaders are politically appointed. This new element of partial democ-
racy encourages vitality and initiative. Members delegate control over the co-operative’s ac-
tivities to the leaders. This feature goes some way towards the second principle—democratic
control by the members.
The third principle is economic participation by the members in the business of their co-
operative. This principle is interpreted as socialization, in that members participate mainly
through work. The distribution of proﬁts is according to work contributed, as with the old
communes, but also in some cases according to the member’s ﬁnancial investment in shares
in the co-operative. It is notable that this distribution among members takes place after “a
fair and reasonable distribution of revenue among the members, the collective, and the
State.” This distribution of revenue, after “market transactions,” is an institutional decision
involving more than the elected leaders of the co-operative, and hence limits the economic
participation of the members.
The fourth principle is autonomy and independence. The new co-operatives feature a
limited amount of both. Political leaders are appointed to work with the elected leaders of
the co-operatives. The co-operatives need a permit to operate and must report to political
leaders in their region.
The ﬁfth principle of co-operation is not a feature of the new economic co-operatives.
As is the case in Canada, though less so, the education, training, and information function
of co-operatives is weak and not accorded priority.
The sixth principle is co-operation among co-operatives. The SPTAs co-ordinate their
activities extensively on procurement of inputs, marketing, and processing, although the lit-
erature does not indicate how much of this is reserved for co-ops and how much is devoted
to relations with state corporations, industrial collectives, and government departments.
The seventh and last principle is concern for the community. The new Chinese co-
operatives are part of the larger policy to build a socialist and communist state.
Summary of the Co-operative Evolutionary Process in Canada and China
The evolution of the co-operative movement in Canada and China has characteristics that
are both parallel and distinct. In the early days in both countries, co-operatives were based
on family farms that had exclusive rights to land. In Canada, co-operatives arose as part of
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services. In China, the social movement was directed at land reform, labour pooling, and the
reduction of poverty.
Initially, the governments of both countries encouraged and prodded farmers to orga-
nize. In China, farmers were organized to exchange labour and to co-ordinate the use of
farm tools and draft animals. Essentially, these Mutual Aid Teams were small local co-op-
eratives guided by principles similar to those of today’s International Co-operative Alliance,
which also inﬂuenced the development of the ﬁrst co-operatives in Canada. There, the gov-
ernment assisted by enacting new co-operatives legislation, market standards, and inspection
services.
Co-operatives have continued to develop strongly in Canada to the present day, whereas
in China, their development was interrupted by collectivization. In 1958, both co-operatives
and family farms, together with their autonomy and land rights, were replaced with State-
imposed communal institutions. And from then until 1978, the traditions of voluntary par-
ticipation and autonomy in rural co-operation gave way to compulsory collective action to
solve the pressing problems of the food supply and to meet the challenges of the cold war.
After 1978, co-operatives re-emerged in China, with many of the characteristics of the
old Mutual Aid Teams, but without much of the original congruency with the ICA princi-
ples. The new economic co-operatives offered gradual improvement of opportunities for
voluntary participation, autonomy, and some democracy as compared to the People’s Com-
munes and the rural collectives. Farmers now claim a greater share of the income from their
hard work and risk taking.
Today’s specialized production co-operatives in China and the New Generation Co-op-
eratives in Canada could evolve into strong niche marketing and service organizations. In
China, they could strengthen the results of national economic reforms by taking over some
of the functions of processing collectives to supply State marketing corporations, or federate
to gain market power as part of the market reforms. Canadian NGCs could evolve to com-
plement the development of North American conglomerate co-operatives in global trade.
Co-operatives in both countries, however, have a number of lessons to learn if they are
to evolve successfully to play a signiﬁcant role in the development of agriculture in the
twenty-ﬁrst century.
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HE STRUCTURE, TYPE, AND PERFORMANCE of rural co-operatives
reﬂect the circumstances of the time and place of their origin and devel-
opment, and also the social and economic position of their founders (Van Dooren 1982).
Canadian and Chinese co-operatives preparing to meet the needs of members over the next
ﬁfteen years face several problems requiring special attention.
PROBLEMS FACING CANADIAN RURAL CO-OPERATIVES
Apparently successful co-operatives in Canada are troubled most by a lack of understanding
of  co-operative principles (Stringham 1996). Although these principles were undoubtedly in
the minds of the men and women who originally organized Canada’s rural co-operatives, the
pressures of initial activities made it difficult to sustain them in the minds of rapidly growing
memberships. And, like many new businesses, some co-operatives were economically unsuc-
cessful from the start (MacPherson 1979).
Six main problems are identiﬁed in this study. The ﬁrst is the shifting ground resulting
from the rapid globalization of the rural economy. Second, both members and leaders are
having difficulty understanding the function of co-operatives in this new rural economy.
Third, conﬂicts are arising between members’ individual and collective interests, especially
as society evolves to accord greater merit and legitimacy to individual enterprise than to
collective pursuits. The fourth problem is that growing competition between corporate and
co-operative companies demands greater and greater strategic and management skill from
C ENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF CO-OPERATIVESco-operatives. Consequent action is often in conﬂict with co-operative principles. Fifth, a
general disequilibrium in the rural Canadian economy is dividing the interests of prosperous
and poor co-operative members. Sixth and ﬁnally, the gaps are widening among members’
equity, needs for liquidity, and public liability. The following discussion examines each
point in detail.
Global shifts are forcing many co-operatives to struggle with unfamiliar options.
Traditional organizational linkages between members and leaders have been weakened.
Co-operative principles are being challenged as the members’ vision changes and com-
petitive practices are forced on managers. A new generation of participants is reshaping
the fundamental role of co-operatives in the dynamic restructuring of the rural Canadian
economy.
The New Generation Co-operatives are a good example. They represent a younger
generation of farmers preparing to tackle co-operatively the challenges of concentration in
deregulated markets, the emergence of specialized market niches, and increased vertical co-
ordination and integration in business (Harris et al 1995).
The function of the agricultural co-operative in the face of these challenges is not well
understood by elected directors, managers, or the membership. The values of founding
members are being replaced by a bias against co-operation, and even co-operative educators
are not immune from these inﬂuences. Perhaps the best example is the debate over grain
marketing in western Canada.
Individual farmers are challenging sixty years of pooled grain marketing by the Canadian
Wheat Board, a marketing board backed by the co-operative grain assembly system. They
claim the right to sell their grain to the highest bidder any time they wish, without pool-
ing the returns with fellow farmers. And they appear to be encouraged by private North
American conglomerate grain companies and ideological sympathizers in provincial
governments.
Second, and a central problem, is that the principles of co-operation have not been
passed down through the affluent postwar years to the members of co-operatives, their lead-
ers, and employees. Fundamental skills of organization and an appreciation of why farmers
need co-operatives are becoming lost. Co-operative education is underﬁnanced for the same
reasons that it is needed; the payoff is not understood. Like other aspects of education and
rural social services taken on by governments during the past sixty years, co-operative educa-
tion is being downloaded to institutions now unable to assume responsibility.
The third problem is the conﬂict between the business interests of the members and the
collective interests of the group. From the beginning of market co-operatives, for example,
farmers formed co-operatives to get a fair price for commodities and inputs such as fertilizer.
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at prices reﬂecting monopoly structures in the global fertilizer market, which weakens the
credibility of the co-operative advantage. Members then shop widely, responding to aggres-
sive service and discriminatory discounting by private dealers. The volume of co-operative
business and member loyalty are both reduced in the process.
Directors and managers understand that co-operatives must become larger to serve and
earn members’ business, but this places the corporate interests of the organization in direct
conﬂict with co-operative principles, just as the individual interests of members come in
conﬂict with the collective interests of the co-operative. Co-operatives do need to develop
and change, and they do need more capital, just as their members need more direct tangible
economic beneﬁts. The problem is complex. If left unaddressed, the conﬂict between mem-
bers and leadership will continue.
The fourth problem is that competition between agricultural co-operatives and other
companies is increasing sharply. Co-operatives, publicly-held companies, and small busi-
nesses all need to return money in the form of dividends to their owners. They also need
to reinvest to position themselves for competition.
The difference is that co-operative members both own and determine the business
volume of their company. Consequently, the same individuals who are members/share-
holders, challenging other companies for market share, must not only be satisﬁed by divi-
dends, but also be convinced by fair practices, service, and pricing, to do business with
their co-operative.
The intensity of competition extends to efforts by publicly-held companies to buy out
or merge with successful market or service co-operatives such as the Rural Electriﬁcation
Associations in Alberta. The lure of a lump-sum payment to co-operative members for their
equity is hard to resist. Members, as opposed to their directors, who have a longer-term
view, often prefer to sell their co-operatives.
Today’s competition, particularly by large conglomerates, leads members and managers
alike to compare the performance of co-operatives with that of other companies (West and
Williamson 1978). The strongest competition comes from the ability of publicly-held com-
panies to ﬁnance expansion and modernization. Canada’s agricultural co-operatives have an
aging membership, which upon retirement from farming, takes its equity with it. The pro-
mised payouts are a charge against ﬁnancial reserves and the ability to pay patronage divi-
dends, facing co-operatives with a choice of borrowing money or ﬁnding more equity to
ﬁnance the capital projects necessary to compete.
Some co-operatives, such as the United Grain Growers and the Saskatchewan Wheat
Pool, chose to expand their equity by selling shares to the general public, including competi-
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route is more controversial because it challenges the best-known principle of co-operatives—
member control.
Competition is also reﬂected in the business structures of co-operatives. Their competi-
tion comes largely from conglomerates, companies with diverse holdings in Canada and off-
shore, which have the ability to use transfer pricing and cross-subsidies to convince even the
most loyal co-op members to abandon their co-operative. Global holdings are well beyond
the conventional idea of export markets for members of agricultural co-operatives, whose
organizations were founded to sell products at good prices, or to provide a local service when
rural commerce was exploitive or absent.
Domestic food and commodity markets in Canada do not hold the growth potential
needed to sustain several players. If co-operatives are to triumph as the dominant player, or
even survive to provide competition to another dominant player, they need to subsidize their
members’ interests with strategic metropolitan or offshore enterprises. Equity investments in
these companies, especially those related to their Canadian specialization, such as fertilizers,
open up a vast array of strategic options in the areas of transfer pricing and capture of eco-
nomic rents to help ﬁnance their Canadian vision.
The ﬁfth problem faced by modern co-operatives involves the conﬂicting signals rooted
in the disequilibrium in the rural Canadian economy. While some regions and communities
ﬂourish, rural Canada also has dying villages and towns, substandard social services, and a
chronic shortage of money for private and public investment. Unemployment rates are par-
ticularly high among rural youth, seasonal workers, and in the eastern rural areas. The work-
force in coastal ﬁshing, western logging, and central Canadian rural manufacturing has lost
jobs in the past decade, and similar losses may be anticipated for western farm families in the
coming decade (Apedaile and Reimer 1996).
These regional problems also occur among co-op members and within rural commu-
nities. The main core of the rural economy is making money and building wealth, with or
without co-operatives. Many co-operatives are focussed generally on the successful majority
for obvious reasons of membership and ﬁnancial viability. However, the older generation,
those on smaller farms, and rural people marginalized by global change, are among the
strongest, most loyal supporters of co-operatives, which grew originally out of the need to
address adversity and poverty. These members keep reminding co-operatives of the seventh
ICA principle—that co-operatives should support their communities.
This social tension within the membership hampers decision-making in co-operatives.
They cannot afford to be stigmatized as socialist institutions for losers, but rather, need to be
recognized as progressive business institutions to sustain their role of disciplining otherwise
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principles when the vision changes as well as the practices.
The sixth and ﬁnal problem facing co-operatives in rural Canada is the gradually widen-
ing gap among members’ equity, needs for liquidity, and public liability. This subtle techni-
cal problem is a feature of activity in markets much larger than a co-operative membership
and also in foreign jurisdictions. Members’ equity in their own enterprises as well as in the
co-operative itself may be placed at risk by new practices and business structures. This risk is
not understood by most members, and not easily insured. The need for ﬁnancial liquidity
includes both the requirements of strategies to manage this risk, and the liability to members
who may wish to withdraw their patronage-based equity.
PROBLEMS FACING CHINESE RURAL CO-OPERATIVES
Small family farms are the basic units of production in China today, and they face problems
with the economic reforms that could be reduced by membership in a modern co-operative.
Farmers want to co-operate, but they still have a number of difficulties to overcome.
Six problems are selected here. They stem either from the close association of co-opera-
tion with political movements since 1949, or the issues that could be addressed by establish-
ing co-operatives. The ﬁrst problem—a lack of understanding about the idea of
co-operatives—is based on the frightful memory of the way co-operatives were misused in
the early 1950s to serve the hidden agenda of communal organization. The second is the
heavy role of government in co-operatives since 1980. The third is the association of new
collective institutions with sweeping political movements. Fourth, market structures are un-
competitive, relatively unregulated, yet subject to government intervention. Fifth, the lucra-
tive opportunities from uncompetitive market practice tied to political entitlements could
result in unfair competition to new co-operatives. Finally, the changing structure of the farm
household in the face of the growing power of traders poses a formidable organizational
challenge. These difficulties are discussed in detail below.
The ﬁrst problem facing Chinese agricultural co-operatives is misunderstanding the
idea of co-operatives. After major changes in the collective system, and the horrors of the
Cultural Revolution, farmers rejected the Rural People’s Communes, which had been such
a dreadful experience for them.
Over the two decades up to 1978, the type of organization, the principles, and the pur-
pose of co-operation promoted by political slogans led Chinese farmers to poor results (see
table 10). Per capita income grew from Y43 to only Y74 over the twenty-two-year period from
1956, as People’s Agricultural Communes were used to subsidize China’s industrialization.
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Communes in Sichuan and Anhui provinces were
among the poorest people in China. People re-
member co-operatives not as solutions but as the
source of poverty.
The second problem is that farmers lack an
ability to self-organize into co-operatives. Since
Emperor Qin uniﬁed China into a centralized
feudal monarchy, the tradition of centralized au-
thority and paternalism has been ﬁrmly established
and persists to this day.
The People’s Commune was an organization
that integrated government administration and
economic management, extending the central
government’s control right down to the farm level.
The economic command structure was uniﬁed
from top to bottom. At the top, uniﬁed leadership,
uniﬁed planning, and uniﬁed distribution of in-
come provided the basis for control. At the bot-
tom, government exhorted farmers to seek unity
of thinking, unity of organizing, and unity of ac-
tion. This hierarchical control has created in farm-
ers a profound dependence on someone else’s
leadership. Used to relying on government, they
are not adept at thinking about what, why, and
how to act economically.
The third problem is that institutional reform
has been closely linked to overriding political movements since 1949, which has created scep-
ticism about new institutional solutions to farmers’ problems. Every movement made sweep-
ing changes, and although an upsurge in agricultural production usually followed each one,
farmers’ incomes were not so fortunate.
The political agenda is at the heart of all economic activity in rural China. Mobilizing
slogans such as: “Political work is the lifeblood of all economic work”; “Grasp revolution,
promote production”; and “Grasp the key link of class struggle and bring about great order
across the land,” indicate the extent of its pervasive inﬂuence (table 11). The communal ap-
proach, in effect, considered farmers to be an army.
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Table 10: Average Annual Per Capita
Incomes for Rural People’s Communes






















Source: Chinese Agricultural Statistics
Yearbook, 1980.Table 11: The Relationship between Agricultural Movements and Political Movements in China, 1951–present
Year Political Movement Agricultural Co- Features of the Move- Result
operative Movement ments in Rural China
1951 The movement against the three Temporary Mutual Aid Teams Jointly owned; the Successful
evils—corruption, waste, and and All-Year-Round Mutual two movements
bureaucracy within the Party, Aid Teams—elementary orga- promote each other
government, army, and mass nizations in China’s agricultural
organizations co-operative movement
1953 The movement of co-operative Elementary Agricultural Through the co-op move- Good
transformation of agriculture Producers’ Co-operatives ment the State carries out
changes into collectivization of are established, followed the socialist transformation
agriculture; the Anti-Rightists by Advanced Agricultural of agriculture; to eliminate
Struggle Producers’ Co-operatives private ownership of the
means of production;
semi-socialist and socialist
1958 The Three Red Banners—the The Rural People’s Communes Communist model; the tran- Bad, or
General Line for Socialist Con- are established sition from socialist to com- failure (in-
struction, the Great Leap Forward, munist; owned and organized expedient
and the People’s Communes; the by government; revolutioni- or unwise)
movement against Right deviation zation of ideology and mili-
tarization of action
1960 The “Four Clean-Ups” movement The movement of People’s Com- Means of production owned “Three Bad
in some rural areas munes continues unchanged by government Years”
1963 The Socialist Education Movement The People’s Communes Adjustment of economics; Not too
—a nationwide movement to clean continue unchanged reduction of the basic ac- bad
things up in the ﬁelds of politics, counting unit; two move-
economics, organization, and ments sometimes promote
ideology each other; farmers have
private plots and privately
owned livestock
1966 The movement of the Great Movement of Rural People’s Combats restoration Very bad; bad
Proletarian Cultural Revolution Communes continues of capitalism in an all- old practices
round way die hard
1977 The movement of education in Movement of People’s Com- Sticking out political Economy on
Two-Line Struggle in rural areas munes continues; Household the verge of 
Responsibility Reforms sprout collapse
in rural areas
After Chinese government declares The movement of various types Jointly owned; farmers regain Better
1979 that a new political movement of co-operatives—New System partial democratic and volun-
will never, ever occur in China; of Household Co-operative eco- tary participation in farming,
education of material and nomy; co-ops among specialized production, and marketing;
mental civilization crops and livestock; farmers’ socialist marketing economic
associations, etc system
Farmers regain some land rights;
A variety of co-operatives emerge government power over agricul-
Political reform and the reform and continue to emerge tural production is reduced
1982 of organizations; education of Agriculture
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ple, social movements are largely political. Co-operative activity began before 1949 as a politi-
cal strategy within a social movement.
Table 11 tells us that the agricultural co-operative movement served the revolutionary
need to concentrate property for collective, public ownership. Even today, the political
tendency to assume that the collective system is superior to the co-operative approach is a
serious constraint on co-operation in China. The political view is that the family farm and
independent co-operatives are not really compatible with the goal of a socialist state, and
should be curbed. This perspective strongly inﬂuences rural leaders in some places, who seek
to strengthen the collective economy, despite the economic and market reforms, rather than
to strengthen the link between family farms and autonomous co-operatives, which some
rural leaders avoid even discussing.
Market structure is the fourth problem. With minor coastal exceptions, China was
closed to international commerce for thousands of years. This policy kept rural China
focussed on self-sufficiency and a natural resource economy. Commodity sales, especially
after 1949, were conﬁned to small markets separated by very high transaction costs, mainly
for transport.
Since the 1978 reforms, China has been making the transition from a centrally planned
economic system to what is termed a “socialist market economic system.” Planning still
exists at the macroeconomic level, but great improvements to interregional transport are
opening up local markets. Faced with these new market forces instead of regulated prices,
many farmers are perplexed. They had been accustomed to a much simpler system—security
of basic needs in which every farmer had secure work, known as an unbreakable “iron rice
bowl.”
Farmers lack marketing experience, especially in dealing with the strategies of price dis-
crimination, market segmentation, collusion, and generally uncompetitive practices. These
structural problems are reinforced by other difficulties associated with political entitlements
without accountability, lack of recourse through the justice system, and arbitrary taxation.
Farmers are not always able to get needed supplies or to sell their products at what they con-
sider reasonable prices. They now have direct experience of the “price scissors.” New entre-
preneurs often cheat them by using inaccurate weights and measures. Unforeseen taxes in
the exchange of industrial products for agricultural goods extract further income from farm-
ers. Although the government wishes to narrow the price scissors, state monopolies continue
to offer low prices for grain, cotton, oilseeds, etc. These problems in commodity markets
combine with difficulties in market structure for inputs and consumer goods to maintain ad-
verse agricultural terms of trade.
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face opposition, not only from the political side, as explained above, but also from market
traders, who are becoming more and more politically powerful.
The markets are growing rapidly in sophistication, based in part on entitlements from
political relationships. Commodity markets for meats, ﬁsh, fruits, vegetables, and artisan
products are increasingly remote from farms. Hence there are fewer local social and cultural
checks on the honesty of transactions. Traders, integrated with transport services, separate
farmers from consumers in these new lucrative urban markets. Given this milieu, efforts by
farmers to form co-operatives could be expected to be met by strategic opposition.
The sixth problem is the changing structure of the farm household. In the new market
economy, the option for small farms to grow larger, adopt new technology, and beneﬁt from
economies of size is limited. Despite informal consolidation of land into larger farms, the
government is opposed to concentrated ownership and farm credit is rationed. Co-operatives
of various types seem to offer an alternative to farm consolidation and market concentration,
but the restructuring of household activities places severe limitations on farmers’ ability to
take the initiative to organize co-operatively. A majority of farm households are pluriactive,
with the male labour committed off the farm. Women, the aged, and children are left on the
farms to manage day-to-day operations, work, and face the new markets. These people are
the weakest elements in the new Chinese rural economy, especially in doing business. They
are not the decision makers; the men are, and they are increasingly preoccupied with the
nonfarm economy.
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DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION
I
NSPIRED BY FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC HARDSHIP, agricultural
co-operatives in both Canada and China were established to achieve speciﬁc
purposes. In both cases they were social movements, though more politically directed in
China, and more economically driven in Canada.
The focus in this paper is on economic purpose and the principles of co-operation.
For small farms in China, the economic purposes were productivity, economies of size, and
land redistribution to break feudal poverty. The problem in Canada during the early years
of this century was uncompetitive behaviour in agricultural markets. In both cases, co-opera-
tives were set up as part of a government policy to challenge vested interests in the rural
economies.
THE CO-OPERATIVE CHALLENGE
The problems facing today’s co-operatives in both countries can be traced back to the
original co-operative challenge to economic, political, and social institutions. The seven
principles adopted by the ICA at the 1995 Manchester congress are all related to sustaining
that spirit and willingness to co-operate, but as these principles are diluted and masked, so
co-operatives are challenged more and more effectively by other business institutions.
Pressure is put on co-operatives to change their practices. Global institutional restructur-
ing creates needs for ﬁnancing and reorganization that go well beyond members’ capabilities
to provide. The dynamics of social change and political movements challenge conventional
practices of “business as usual.” Even more fundamental is the pressure to change their vi-
sion. Co-operative principles, necessary to translate vision into practice and sustain member
commitment, become squeezed by the changes.
O CCASIONAL PAPERS SERIES #98–01The underlying economic objective for co-operatives has always been to improve re-
turns to farmers’ resources, labour, and intellectual property. Production co-operatives,
such as the SPTAs in China, focus on technology and economies of size, supplemented by
economies in procurement of inputs and marketing of commodities, to fulﬁl this objective.
Marketing co-operatives are more prevalent in Canada. They focus on improving agricul-
tural terms of trade and the purchasing power of farmers, using countervailing market
strength to offset monopolistic forces.
What lessons can be learned from these challenges facing co-operatives in China and
Canada?
LESSON ONE: LEADERSHIP
Some co-operative principles endure. From the very ﬁrst co-operatives—ﬁre insurance orga-
nizations established in Great Britain in 1696—down through three hundred years of co-op-
erative experience, democratic leadership has proven to be the central attribute of successful
co-operation. Technocratic bureaucracy is a poor substitute for the traditional co-operative
leadership model, as leadership is lost when only 20–25 percent of members vote; when edu-
cation programs cease; and when leaders, however selected, make arbitrary decisions and
take peremptory action affecting the welfare of members.
LESSON TWO: MEMBERS’ WELFARE
Members and managers need to be reminded that their priority is to improve the welfare of
the members. Focussing co-operative policy on this goal sustains the interest of the member-
ship and attracts new commitment in new members.
Rural Chinese people in the agricultural collectives lost interest in problem solving and
creative work, which led to the need for the Household Responsibility Reforms of 1978. And
although agricultural collectives assured subsistence and high rates of investment, rural in-
comes stagnated for more than twenty years (table 10). Collectives provided an effective ve-
hicle for compulsory accumulation of communal savings, but they were equally effective at
fulﬁlling the government’s purpose of transferring the economic surplus generated by farm-
ers to the cities, to industry, and to the military. Little was left, in most years, to improve the
livelihood of rural producers (Selden 1993).
Failure to beneﬁt the members, whether by mismanagement, oversized administra-
tion, inefficiency, incompetence, or by excessive taxation, normally puts a co-operative in
jeopardy.
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Education plays several major roles in sustaining the performance of agricultural co-opera-
tives. The ﬁrst is to maintain the commitment of the members and leadership to the princi-
ples of co-operation. The second is to nurture a learning culture among the members on
matters of technology, management, and markets. A third role is the development of new
leaders, and a fourth, tolerance of the diversity needed to sustain vitality of commitment.
Many of the problems facing co-operatives in Canada and in China stem from problems
with the learning culture of members, directors, and paid staff. Education feeds this culture,
whether co-operatives serve the most modern, commercially sophisticated interests of rural
Canada and China, or are organized to deliver services to poor, marginalized rural house-
holds.
Co-operatives need to learn about the new relationships between members and man-
agers, the co-operative and ﬁnancial markets, and how to match co-operative practices
and principles in global enterprise. Members need educating about the dynamics of rela-
tionships with government, how to work in rapidly changing niche markets, and the prin-
ciples of democratic participation in policy and management. They also need instruction
about social relationships within the community, volunteer skills, ﬁnancial management,
and self-reliance.
Co-operative organizations require education in co-operation, co-operative principles,
organization, technology speciﬁc to their purpose, and market economics. They need knowl-
edge and information, for example, about market forecasting, statistical monitoring, exten-
sion, product testing and licensing, product inspections, and standards.
Members and management lose strategic advantage when they misunderstand the idea
of co-operation and use their organizational structure inﬂexibly or ineffectively. Short-run
opportunistic behaviour reveals a lack of budgeting and long-range strategic planning, not
to mention a lack of effective political action that protects the co-operative from harmful
administrative stagnation or legislative action (Develtere 1992). Education can promote
member commitment to policies favourable to co-operative business success. “Farmers
themselves should make the decision, but they should make that decision with their eyes
wide open” (Roehle 1996).
Education is also one of the best preventive measures against organizational and eco-
nomic failure when co-operatives go through difficult times, as most do from time to time.
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tion, practice, how to organize, and how to operate. Without the sustaining co-operative
ideal, members tend to be destructively competitive among themselves and in their relation-
ships with other co-operatives. Examining the historical process of co-operative development
in Canada and China, it is apparent that success and failure is closely linked to member
commitment to fundamental principles.
In recent years, economists have turned their attention to the role of human resources in
economic development. Davey and Hassan (1974) provide evidence that higher individual
incomes are linked to better education, and by extension, the same result should apply to
collectivities of individuals, such as co-operatives. Science and technology are productive
forces. Understanding bargaining power in markets improves prices. Productivity, output,
and quality create economic power. Co-operative relationships with universities, scientists,
and technicians can engender new ideas and the conﬁdence to take bold decisions to put
things into practice and blaze new trails.
A co-operative can buy or import many things, but the quality of its farmer members—
its human resources—lies solely within the organization. In China as in Canada, it is impor-
tant to promote and improve the basic education of farmers. Most importantly, members
need to learn through co-operation how to transfer risk and uncertainty from technology,
the market, and the ecosphere, to the political arena (Apedaile and Harrington 1995).
LESSON FOUR: DYNAMICS
Agriculture is changing in both China and Canada from extensive cultivation to intensive
farming; from supply driven to market driven; from generic goods to differentiated value-
added products; from traditional methods to modern methods. And most of the new genera-
tion of younger farmers in both countries have off-farm job commitments.
These dynamics do not mean that the problems that led to the original co-operative so-
cial movements in the two countries have changed. The development of NGCs in Canada is
evidence of the same type of technology and scale problems that have inspired recent co-op-
eratives in China. Similarly, the terms-of-trade problems experienced by Chinese farmers are
the same ones that inspired much of the Canadian co-operative movement.
What is different is property rights. In general, co-operatives do not seem to work as
well, and are not as ﬂexible in their approach to business, when they are working with
common property. The dynamics in agriculture mean that co-operatives need constantly
to revise their relationships with their members and with the rest of the economy. The
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool in Canada, for example, which originally specialized in grain
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and dramatically new relationships with private shareholders through equity capital markets.
LESSON FIVE: CULTURE AND IDEOLOGY
Different countries have different ideological positions, different visions and practices, and
different organizational models (Develtere 1992). These differences do not alter the princi-
ples of sustaining commitment for co-operation, but they do change the ways in which the
principles are implemented. Each co-operative, not to mention each country, will follow its
own path, with similar principles but different approaches.
Compare, for example, specialized and multipurpose conglomerate co-operatives in
Canada. The NGCs are new specialized co-operatives, each starting up as a new opportunity
arises, while the SWP is an established multipurpose co-operative. Although both raise capi-
tal from shareholders, an NGC is capitalized by its members only (supplemented by borrow-
ing), whereas the SWP obtains equity from both members and other shareholders. The NGC
focuses on a single market and contractual relationships, whereas the SWP uses mainly day-
to-day market transactions in many markets.
The SPTAs in rural China, quite distinct from Canadian NGCs, were all established at
nearly the same time with a near identical form of organization. But like the Canadian
organizations, they also need to be different from one another, according to their members’
vision and speciﬁc technology problems, if they are to achieve a similar vitality.
LESSON SIX: REGIONAL DIVERSITY
Both Canada and China are large, diverse, regionalized countries with distinct regional
cultures and a variety of climates, topography, and resource endowments. As a result, there
is considerable diversity in levels of economic development, farming techniques, cropping
patterns, productivity, and levels of market development.
Under the principles of free association and autonomy, agricultural co-operatives can be
as different from Shandong to Xinjiang as they are between Alberta and Québec, and be-
tween China and Canada.
National agricultural policy in China, including the organization of agricultural co-
operatives, is identical across all its regional diversity, from north to south, east to west,
from pastoral areas to agricultural areas, from central and coastal regions to more remote
and mountainous regions. In marked contrast, agricultural co-operatives in Canada, like
the country’s agricultural policies, have a regional ﬂavour.
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pendence and autonomy of farmers, ﬁshers, forest operators, and others. Regional diversity
exists in Canada because groups have the freedom to invent their own co-operative organiza-
tions in response to regional needs and resources. That is why the Alberta Wheat Pool is so
different from the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, even though they are in neighbouring pro-
vinces, started for the same reasons, were part of the same social movement, and were spe-
cialized in identical ways.
LESSON SEVEN: COMMUNITY DIVERSITY
In each region, diverse cultures coexist side by side in the same communities. Imagine
three rural Chinas or Canadas (Apedaile and Reimer 1996). The ﬁrst is part of the competi-
tive global economy in cultural, political, and economic terms. This rurality is nearly the
same in both countries, for all commodities, and across all regions. As Davila Villers says
about “Mexico One,” it uses international credit cards, is wealthy, uses airplanes, and is on
time (Davila Villers 1997).
The second is mainly in the business of producing niche products, and market and non-
market services for domestic use. It has a comfortable level of living, uses cars, trains, and
domestic ﬂights, and is almost on time. It is also politically active, involved in government,
and lobbies successfully for privileges to protect and subsidize special local interests.
The third focuses primarily on survival. These people do not have credit cards, are poor,
walk, ride in old trucks, tractor trailers, or take the bus, and are never on time. This group is
marginalized from political life and classiﬁed stigmatically as peasants, welfare groups, lazy,
minorities, or aboriginals.
Both Canada and China have these three groups of rural interests. In recognition of this,
both countries need to encourage even more diversity of co-operative organization within
each community and region. Successful implementation of the seven ICA principles requires
and enables each co-operative to be different from the next.
LESSON EIGHT: SIZE
Co-operatives do not have an optimum size, the best size being the one that is manageable
by the membership for the purpose at hand. Several considerations help to determine the
best size: the way size is measured; the type of co-operative; the ﬁnancial capacity of the
members; the size of the market; the nature of the technology; and the balance of priorities
between the purposes of social movement and business.
36 ZHU AND APEDAILE
CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF CO-OPERATIVESSize is most often determined by the number of members and the assets. A market co-
operative, for example, is measured by volume of transactions; a production co-operative by
the volume of output or sales. Housing co-operatives are measured by the number of apart-
ments, or people housed. Each purpose deﬁnes different assessments of size.
The most useful initial size is the number of people holding a common interest, which
can be discovered during the process of organizing the social movement to start the co-oper-
ative. In China, leaders may go from household to household and organize meetings. If the
interest translates into a broad common vision, the co-operative may be larger than when a
specialized interest is involved. Housing and ﬁshing co-operatives, for example, tend to be
smaller than credit co-operatives.
In Canada, co-operatives generally start within a local community or administrative
jurisdiction. As their capacity to do business grows, they either form a federation with other
local co-operatives, or extend their business across local boundaries into national and inter-
national markets. The regional wholesaling co-operatives, for example, are formed by the
federation of consumer retail co-operatives in hundreds of small rural towns on the prairies
and in eastern Canada. And isolated artisan co-operatives, typical of aboriginal organiza-
tions, come together to form larger marketing co-operatives to sell their products. The
Saskatchewan and Alberta wheat pools are good examples of co-operatives that have grown
large enough to expand their activities across boundaries.
Co-operatives serving “rural Canada and China One,” as brieﬂy described in Lesson
Seven, above, tend to be large in terms of sales and assets, and sometimes small in terms of
members. In “rural China and Canada Two,” co-operatives are smaller in terms of assets,
sales, and membership. In “rural Canada and China Three,” co-operatives are usually local,
with small memberships, few assets, and often no sales, but they may be much larger in
terms of intangible services to their members.
LESSON NINE: GOVERNMENT RELATIONS
Thomas Jefferson’s famous words, “The best government is the government that governs
least,” challenges co-operatives in both Canada and China to guard against decisions that
may jeopardize the control of the owner members. It also challenges co-operative directors
and managers to avoid organizational controls that may compromise individual member
entrepreneurship. Finally, it challenges governments to refrain from direct intervention in
the internal economic affairs of co-operatives.
At the same time, co-operatives in some sense are the creation of governments. Legis-
lation and regulations provide the framework for them to carry out their challenge to global
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operative members, other businesses, and the general public from ﬁnancial mismanagement,
unfair competition, and irresponsible business practices.
Van Dooren’s work still provides the best summary of the lessons concerning govern-
ment relations. The role of government in relation to co-operatives should be: to actively
promote conditions under which co-operatives will develop and thrive; to create a favourable
climate for the growth of co-operatives by removing obstacles and resisting unfair competi-
tion; to provide adequate and clear legislation on co-operation, regulating the rights and
duties of co-operatives and their members, their liabilities, legal personality, and the like;
to assist with education and training in co-operative values for those on the management
committee; to help establish educational schemes for the membership; and to promote the
spread of co-operative information (Van Dooren 1982).
If government intervention fails to maintain the balance among ideology, political direc-
tion, and speciﬁc objectives and methods, co-operative operations risk becoming too com-
plex for members. The idea of co-operation may become indistinct; principles can be
misrepresented; organization may become dependent on bureaucrats who have no loyalty to
the members. In the worst case scenario—the People’s Communes—co-operatives are trans-
formed into state organizations.
Co-operatives need governments, however, just as much as they need markets. Canada,
like modern China, has a ﬂourishing market economy. Nevertheless, the state still provides
a wide range of public services to agriculture, including research. For some agricultural com-
modities, provincial and federal governments have accorded monopoly power to farmers’
co-operatives in cases where competition could not work. Industrial and service-sector devel-
opment, promoted by the state in both countries, has absorbed surplus agricultural labour,
and more recently, generated pluriactivity for farm households.
China has much to learn from the experience of Canadian co-operatives, which have
been shown to provide effective market outlets for farmers, and also to represent their
interests in negotiations with the state for favourable tax and ﬁnancial treatment. Govern-
ments at all levels can make important contributions to co-operatives, and therefore to rural
development.
CONCLUSION
Agricultural co-operatives can offer a balance among individual productive initiative,
imperfectly competitive markets, imperfect government, and concentration of land and
wealth. They make a stand against monopoly pricing, and ideally aim for competition
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also seek to co-operate with other similar organizations. They are competitive for resources
and in the market-place, but co-operative practice is likely to be most successful as econo-
mies change and restructure.
China is undergoing dramatic and far-reaching economic reform in its rural economy.
And although there is no turning back from the socialist marketing system it now has, the
change from command planning to the new economic order has not yet matured. The man-
agement of the rural economy is in transition and not always reliable. Macroeconomic gov-
ernance is restricted by unﬁnished economic arrangements and an authoritarian managerial
style. Reformation and development are still the main topics in the domain of rural econom-
ics and politics.
National policy for both China and Canada assumes that the agricultural sector will be
based on the family farm. Co-operatives appear to play an important role in sustaining this
structure, especially in terms of rural household incomes. Paradoxically, however, the co-op-
erative sector, often regarded as socialist in Canada, is viewed by many political leaders in
China as incompatible with a socialist state.
China’s dynamic agricultural sector needs an active program to build and support new
co-operatives, not just a policy that maintains the traditional rural institutions. Co-opera-
tives are an integral part of the social and economic fabric of many successful rural
economies, combining the best of individual initiative for productivity, and shared risk and
uncertainty.
What will co-operatives look like in both countries in the ﬁrst twenty years of the
next century? They will be decentralized and driven by member interests. They need new
organizational innovations with strong continuing education to suit speciﬁc diverse situa-
tions in rural China and Canada. Twenty-ﬁrst century co-operatives will retain a clear focus
on member services and farm household income. They will work together in economic al-
liances, with the potential of acquiring all the advantages of the privileged relationships now
limited to conglomerate corporations.
New co-operatives can promote and play an important role in rural economic reform,
offering a wide variety of opportunities to farmers, thus strengthening the farm sector and
beneﬁting governments in both countries. Ultimately, effective new co-operative activity
can help both Canada and China face the looming global era with conﬁdence, and also
contribute to building for agriculture a new “golden bridge” to the twenty-ﬁrst century.
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